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MINIMAL NEGATION IN THE TERNARY
RELATIONAL SEMANTICS
A b s t r a c t. Minimal Negation is defined within the basic
positive relevance logic in the relational ternary semantics: B+.
Thus, by defining a number of subminimal negations in the B+
context, principles of weak negation are shown to be isolable.
Complete ternary semantics are offered for minimal negation in
B+. Certain forms of reductio are conjectured to be undefinable
(in ternary frames) without extending the positive logic. Com-
plete semantics for such kinds of reductio in a properly extended
positive logic are offered.
1. Introduction
Captatio benevolentiae
Consider any positive propositional logic L+ with the binary connec-
tives →, ∧, ∨, ↔ and the propositional falsity constant F . Define ¬A =def
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A→ F . Then, negation can in principle be defined in L+. For instance, if
L+ contains
(i) (A→ (B → C))→ ((A ∧B)→ C))
as a theorem, then
(ii) (A→ ¬B)→ ¬(A ∧B)[(A→ (B → F ))→ ((A ∧B)→ F )]
is a negation theorem of L+. Obviously, the more powerful the positive
logic is, the stronger the negation defined in it will get. What about the
converse? For example, can a positive logic lacking (i) still contain (ii) as
a theorem without turning L+ into a radical different positive logic?
Introduction
Minimal negation is the “positive” negation corresponding to the pos-
itive fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic I+. It was defined by
Kolmogorov in [7] and Johansson in [6] along the lines commented above.
Thus, what is really essential in minimal negation is the positive negation
corresponding to I→ (the implicative fragment of I+), characterized by
the presence of weak double negation [A → ¬¬A], weak contraposition
[(A → B) → (¬B → ¬A)] and weak reductio [(A → ¬A) → ¬A]. Now,
in order to introduce minimal negation in the ternary relational semantics,
we stay at the basic semantical level. Therefore, we introduce minimal
negation within the context of B+.
The logic B+ deserves to be called a basic positive relevance logic to the
effect that the set of its theorems is exactly what is required for the Routley-
Meyer type positive relational semantics to work at its fundamental level.
So, B+ is complete with respect to the basic structures of these semantics.
In fact, B+ is a basic logic with respect to other semantical perspectives,
as shown by Meyer & Routley (in [13]) and Dunn & Meyer (in [4]) and even
with respect to other formal calculi, as Lambek Calculus (see, for example,
[16]). Now, once we have shown how to introduce minimal negation in B+,
we have shown how to introduce this type of negation in any logic definable
with the ternary relational semantics.
Our purpose in this paper is twofold: (a) we introduce minimal nega-
tion in B+ following the historical trend commented above. That is, we
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define the logic B+,F , which is a definitional extension of B+, with the fal-
sity constant F , and (b) we answer the question “can minimal negation be
defined in weaker implicative (positive) logics than I→ (I+) in the context
of the relational ternary semantics?”. And in this question we understand
“minimal negation” as that defined by weak double negation, weak contra-
position and weak reductio. [9] defines it in the positive fragment of the
logic of Relevance R, [10] in contractionless intuitionistic logic, and [11] in
Anderson & Belnap’s minimal positive logic (see [1]). This paper signif-
icantly improves these previous results with the introduction of minimal
negation in such a extremely weak logic as the basic positive logic B+ (see
[2], [14], [16]).
Different negation extensions merge from B+ with different modeliza-
tions of negation by means of the ∗ operator (e.g.,[2], 4-valued semantics
([14],[15]) or Mares’ strategy ([8]) involving the addition of
⊢ A→ B ⇒⊢ ¬B → ¬A
and eventually,
¬¬A→ A
But our concern here remains below these extensions, since we shall
present, in addition to minimal negation, some varieties of and perspectives
on subminimal negation. Obviously, and basically for the same reasons that
make De Morgan or Boolean extensions non trivial (see [12] and [16] for
general results concerning those negation extensions and their limits), the
extension of positive logics (weaker than I→) with minimal negations is not
trivial either. Actually, we show how to introduce minimal negation (in the
sense of (b)) in any positive logic between B+ and R+ .
The point of defining negations in weak positive logics also lies in the
general strategy beyond any particular result. Consider any logic, no mat-
ter how weak it is, if it contains at least B+ . We will show how to treat F
so as to obtain either minimal or indeed other exemplars of the spectrum
of negations. Interestingly, this strategy allows for the axiomatical and se-
mantical isolation of different principles of negation. Moreover, fine-grained
varieties of subminimal negation arise naturally in this setting, which offers
a (fragment of) a kind of microscopical companion to [3] (or [5]). We shall
work with ternary relational frames, as they are particularly apt to our
“microscopical” approach.
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The paper is organized in the following way: §2 presents B+, recalls
some useful semantical facts in a general way and briefly reviews semantic
consistency and completeness. §3 introduces the logic B+F . §§4,5 define
two deductively equivalent logics endowing B+ with reductio-free mini-
mal negation. §6 extends B+ with full minimal negation. §7 conjectures
the need of extending the positive logic to introduce stronger reductio ax-
ioms. §§8,9 endow with both minimal negation and reductio the properly
extended positive logic. §10 briefly considers subminimal extensions and
summarizes in a diagram the main deductive relations between logics stud-
ied in the paper.
2. The logic B+
B+ is axiomatized with
A1. A→ A
A2. (A ∧B)→ A (A ∧B)→ B
A3. ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C))→ (A→ (B ∧ C))
A4. A→ (A ∨B) B → (A ∨B)
A5. ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨B)→ C)
A6. (A ∧ (B ∨ C))→ ((A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
The rules of derivation are
Modus ponens: If ⊢ A and ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ B
Adjunction: If ⊢ A and ⊢ B, then ⊢ A ∧B
Suffixing : If ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ (B → C)→ (A→ C)
Prefixing : If ⊢ B → C, then ⊢ (A→ B)→ (A→ C)
The following formulae (useful in the proof of the completeness theorem)
are derivable:
T1. (A ∧B)→ (B ∧A)
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T2. ((A ∨B) ∧ (C ∧D))→ ((A ∧C) ∨ (B ∧D))
T3. ((A→ C) ∨ (B → D))→ ((A ∧B)→ (C ∨D))
T4. ((A→ C) ∧ (B → D))→ ((A ∧B)→ (C ∧D))
T5. ((A→ C) ∧ (B → D))→ ((A ∨B)→ (C ∨D))
A B+ model is a quadruple ⟨K,O,R, |=⟩ where K is a set, O a subset
of K and R a ternary relation on K subject to the following definitions and
postulates for all a, b, c, d ∈ K with quantifiers ranging over K:
d1. a ≤ b =def ∃x[x ∈ O and Rxab]
d2. R2abcd =def ∃x[Rabx and Rxcd]
P1. a ≤ a
P2. a ≤ b and Rbcd⇒ Racd
|= is a valuation relation from K to the sentences of B+ satisfying
the following conditions for all propositional variables p, wffs A,B and
a, b, c ∈ K:
(i) a |= p and a ≤ b⇒ b |= p
(ii) a |= A ∨B iff a |= A or a |= B
(iii) a |= A ∧B iff a |= A and a |= B
(iv) a |= A→ B iff for all b, c ∈ K, Rabc and b |= A⇒ c |= B
A formula is valid (|=B+ A) iff a |= A for all a ∈ O in all models. P1,
d1 and simple induction on (i) prove:
Theorem 2.1. (Semantic consistency of B+) If ⊢B+ A, |=B+ A
Let KT be the set of all theories (sets of formulas of B+ closed under
adjunction and provable entailment) and RT be defined on KT as follows:
for all formulas A,B and a, b, c, d ∈ KT , RTabc iff if A→ B ∈ a and A ∈ b,
then B ∈ c. Further, let KC be the set of prime theories (a theory a is
prime if whenever A∨B ∈ a, then A ∈ a or B ∈ a), OC the set of all regular
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prime theories (a is regular if it contains all theorems of B+), and RC the
restriction of RT to KC . Finally, let |=C be defined as follows: for any wff
A and a ∈ KC , a |=C A iff A ∈ a. Then, the B+ canonical model is the
quadruple ⟨KC , OC , RC , |=C⟩. We now sketch a proof of the completeness
theorem, recording a series of later useful lemmas whose proofs can be
found (or easily derived from) in, e.g. [2], [11] or [16]:
Lemma 2.1. Let A be any wff, a ∈ KT and A /∈ a. Then, A /∈ x for
some x ∈ KC such that a ⊆ x.
Lemma 2.2. Let RTabc, a, b ∈ KT , c ∈ KC . Then, RTxbc for some
x ∈ KC such that a ⊆ x.
Lemma 2.3. Let RTabc, a, b ∈ KT , c ∈ KC . Then, RTaxc for some
x ∈ KC such that b ⊆ x.
Lemma 2.4. If !B+ A there is some x ∈ OC such that A /∈ x.
Lemma 2.5. Let a, b ∈ KT . The set x = {B : ∃A(A → B ∈ a and
A ∈ b)} is a theory and RTabx.
Lemma 2.6. a ≤C b iff a ⊆ b
Lemma 2.7. The canonical postulates hold in the B+ canonical model.
Lemma 2.8. |=C is a valuation relation satisfying conditions (i)-(iv)
above.
Lemma 2.9. The canonical B+ model is in fact a model.
From Lemmas 2.4 and 2.9 we have,
Theorem 2.2. (Completeness of B+) If |=B+ A, then ⊢B+ A
3. The logic B+,F
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In order to define the logic B+,F , we add to the sentential language
of B+ the propositional falsity constant F together with the definition
¬A =def A → F . For example, we note that the following schemes are
provable in B+,F
T6. If ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ ¬B → ¬A
T7. If ⊢ ¬B, then ⊢ (A→ B)→ ¬A
T8. ⊢ ¬(A ∨B)↔ (¬A ∧ ¬B)
T9. ⊢ (¬A ∨ ¬B)→ ¬(A ∧B)
A B+F model is a quintuple ⟨K,O,S,R, |=⟩ where ⟨K,O,R, |=⟩ is a B+
model and S a subset of K such that S ∩O ≠ Φ. The following clauses are
also added:
(v) a ≤ b and a |= F ⇒ b |= F
(vi) a |= F iff a /∈ S
|=B+,F A (A is B+,F valid) iff a |= A for all a ∈ O in all models.
We note that F is not valid: let a ∈ S ∩ O. Then, a ≠ F . But a ∈ O,
so " B+,FA.
Theorem 3.1 (semantic consistency of B+,F ).
Proof. Immediate by Theorem 2.1. !
We define the B+,F canonical model as the quintuple
⟨KC , OC , SC , RC , |=C⟩
where ⟨KC , OC , RC , |=C⟩ is the B+ canonical model and SC is interpreted
as as the set of all consistent theories. A theory a is consistent iff F /∈ a.
Lemma 3.1. SC ∩OC is not empty.
Proof. As "B+,F F , by Theorem 3.1, we have !B+,F F , i.e., F /∈ B+,F .
Since B+,F is a theory, Lemma 2.1 applies and there is some x ∈ KC such
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that B+F ⊆ x and F /∈ x. Thus x is consistent and x ∈ OC . Therefore,
x ∈ SC . !
Lemma 3.2. Clauses (v) and (vi) hold in the canonical model.
Proof. Lemmas 2.6 and 3.1 respectively. !
Lemma 3.3. The B+,F canonical model is indeed a B+,F model.
Proof. Lemmas 2.9, 3.1 and 3.2. !
Theorem 3.2. (Completeness of B+,F ). If |=B+,F A, ⊢B+,F A.
Proof. Note that an analogue of Lemma 2.4 is immediate for B+,F.
Thus, Theorem 3.2 follows by Lemma 3.3. !
4. B+ with minimal negation but without reductio: the logic
Bm
We add to B+F the axiom
A7. (A→ (B → F ))→ (B → (A→ F ))
Note that, for example, in addition to T6-T9, the following theorems
are provable in Bm:
T10. (A→ ¬B)→ (B → ¬A)
T11. A→ ¬¬A
T12. (A→ B)→ (¬B → ¬A)
T13. ¬¬¬A→ ¬A
T14. (¬A ∧ ¬B)→ ¬(A ∨B)
Models for Bm are defined similarly to those for B+F but with the
addition of the postulate:
P3. R2abcd and d ∈ S ⇒ ∃x∃y(Racx,Rxby and y ∈ S)
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|=Bm A (A is Bm valid) iff a |= A for all a ∈ O in all models.
We prove
Theorem 4.1. (Semantic consistency of Bm) If ⊢Bm A, then |=Bm A.
Proof. Given Theorem 2.1, we have to prove that A7 is valid. Use
P3. !
We define the Bm canonical model as the quintuple
⟨KC , OC , SC , RC , |=C⟩,
where ⟨KC , OC , RC , |=C⟩ is a B+ canonical model and SC is interpreted as
the set of all consistent theories. A theory a is consistent iff the negation
of a theorem does not belong to a.
Lemma 4.1. F ∈ a iff a is inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose F ∈ a. By T7, (F → F ) → F ∈ a. Thus, a is
inconsistent because it contains the negation of a theorem. Suppose now a
is inconsistent. Then, A→ F ∈ a (A is a theorem). By T7, (A→ F )→ F
is a theorem. So, F ∈ a. !
Lemma 4.2. Let RT2abcd, a, b, c, d ∈ KT and d consistent. Then,
there is some x in KC and some y in SC such that RTacx and RTxby.
Proof. Suppose a, b, c, d ∈ KT and d consistent. Suppose further
RT2abcd, i.e., RTabx and RTxcd for some x ∈ KT , d being consistent.
Define [cf. Lemma 2.5.] the theory u = {B : ∃A(A → B ∈ a and A ∈ c)}
such that RTacu. Next, define the theory w = {B : ∃A(A → B ∈ u and
A ∈ b)} such that RTubw. We first prove that w is consistent. Suppose it
is not. Then, F ∈ w [Lemma 4.1.]. By definitions of u and w,A → (B →
F ) ∈ a, A ∈ c and B ∈ b. By A7, B → (A → F ) ∈ a. Given RTabx,
A→ F ∈ x. Given RTxcd, F ∈ d, contradicting the hypothesis.
Summing up, we have u,w ∈ KT with w consistent, RTacu and RTubw.
As F /∈ w, Lemma 2.1 applies and there is some y ∈ KC such that w ⊆ y
and F /∈ y (hence y is consistent). By definitions, RTuby. By Lemma 2.2,
there is some x in KC satisfying RTxby and u ⊆ x. As RTacu, RTacx
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follows from definitions. Therefore, we have x, y ∈ KC (y ∈ SC) such that
RTacx and RTxby, which was to be proved. !
Lemma 4.3. The canonical version of P3 [that is, RC2abcd and d ∈
SC ⇒ ∃x∃y(RCacx and RCxby and y ∈ SC)] holds in the Bm canonical
model.
Proof. Lemma 4.2. !
Lemma 4.4. The Bm canonical model is indeed a Bm model.
Proof. Lemmas 2.9, 3.1, 4.3 and 3.2. !
Now we can prove
Theorem 4.2. (Completeness of Bm)If |=Bm A, ⊢Bm A.
Proof. Note that an analogue of Lemma 2.4 is immediate for Bm.
Thus, Theorem 4.2 follows by Lemma 4.4. !
5. A semantical alternative
The logic Bm′ is B+ plus
A8. A→ ((A→ F )→ F )
and
A9. (A→ B)→ ((B → F )→ (A→ F ))
A Bm′ model is just a Bm model but with these two differences: P3 is
deleted and the following postulates are added:
P4. Rabc and c ∈ S ⇒ ∃x(x ∈ S and Rbax)
P5. R2abcd⇒ ∃x∃y(Racx and Rbcy and y ∈ S)
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As for the semantic consistency of Bm′, we leave to the reader the proof
that A8 (use P4) and A9 (use P5) are valid. Define theBm′ canonical model
similarly to the Bm canonical model and note that an analogue of Lemma
4.1. is immediate. The reader can verify:
Lemma 5.1. P4 and P5 hold in the canonical model.
Next, we have
Lemma 5.2. The Bm′ canonical model is a Bm′ model.
Proof. Lemmas 2.9, 3.1, 3.2 and 5.1. !
Finally, we prove
Theorem 5.1. (Completeness of Bm′) If |= Bm′A, then ⊢ Bm′A.
Proof. As an analogue of Lemma 2.4 is immediate, Theorem 5.1 follows
by Lemma 5.2. !
Bm and Bm′ are syntactically equivalent, as stated by the proposition
below:
Lemma 5.3. Given B+, A7 is derivable from A8 and A9. Conversely,
A8 and A9 are, given B+, derivable from A7.
The proof is left to the reader.
6. Bm with the reductio axiom: the logic Bmr
We add to Bm the axiom
A10. (A→ (A→ F ))→ (A→ F )
and note that, in addition to T6-T12, the following are exemplar theorems
and rules of Bmr:
T15. (A→ ¬A)→ ¬A
T16. If ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ (A→ ¬B)→ ¬A
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T17. If ⊢ A→ ¬B, then ⊢ (A→ B)→ ¬A
T18. (A→ ¬B)→ ¬(A ∧B)
T19. (A→ B)→ ¬(A ∧ ¬B)
T20. ¬(A ∧ ¬A)
T21. ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A)
Bmr can alternatively be axiomatized with T16, T17, T18 or T19 in-
stead of A10.
Models for Bmr are defined similarly as those for Bm but with the
addition of the postulate:
P6. Rabc and c ∈ S ⇒ ∃x∃y(Rabx and Rxby and y ∈ S)
To prove the semantic consistency of Bmr with respect to these models,
it is enough to verify the validity of A10 by means of P6. Therefore, we
have
Theorem 6.1. (Semantic consistency of Bmr) If ⊢Bmr A, then
|=Bmr A.
The Bmr canonical model is defined similarly to the corresponding one
for Bm. An analogue for Bmr of Lemma 2.4. is immediate. Then, we
prove
Lemma 6.1. Given a, b, c ∈ KT , c consistent and RTabc, then there
are x ∈ KC , y ∈ SC and RTabx, RTxby.
Proof. Assume hypothesis and define the theory [cf. Lemma 2.5] u =
{B : ∃A(A → B) ∈ a and A ∈ b)} such that RTabu, and the theory
w = {B : ∃A(A → B) ∈ u and A ∈ b)} satisfying RTubw. Suppose for
reductio w is inconsistent. Then, F ∈ w [Lemma 4.1]. By definition of w,
B → F ∈ u, B ∈ b. By definition of u, A→ (B → F ) ∈ a, A ∈ b. Then, by
T17, (A ∧ B)→ F ∈ a. But since RTabc and A ∧ B ∈ b [A,B ∈ b], F ∈ c,
contradicting the consistency of c. Therefore, w is consistent. Now, we use
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Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 to extend u and w to some x ∈ KC (u ⊆ x) and some
y ∈ SC (w ⊆ y) such that RTabx and RTxby, as required. !
Lemma 6.2. Canonical P6 holds in the Bmr canonical model.
Proof: Lemma 6.1. !
Lemma 6.3. The Bmr canonical model is a Bmr model.
Proof. Lemmas 4.4 and 6.2. !
Finally, we have
Theorem 6.2. (Completeness of Bmr) If |=Bmr A, then ⊢Bmr A.
Proof. By an analogue of Lemma 2.4 and 6.3. !
7. Note on the reductio axiom
As we have seen in §6, the reductio axiom, i.e.,
T15. (A→ ¬A)→ ¬A
or the reductio rules
T16. If ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ (A→ ¬B)→ ¬A
T17. If ⊢ A→ ¬B, then ⊢ (A→ B)→ ¬A
are provable in Bmr. But we remark that the reductio theorems corre-
sponding to T16 and T17, that is,
ρ. (A→ B)→ ((A→ ¬B)→ ¬A)
and
ρ′. (A→ ¬B)→ ((A→ B)→ ¬A)
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are not. A simple proof of this fact is the following. Consider the set of
matrices below, where designated values are starred and F is assigned the
value 1.
→ 0 1 2 3
0 3 3 3 3
1 1 2 2 3
2∗ 0 1 2 3
3∗ 0 0 1 3
∧ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1
2∗ 0 1 2 2
3∗ 0 1 2 3
∨ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 1 2 3
2∗ 2 2 2 3
3∗ 3 3 3 3
This set verifies Bmr but falsifies (A → B) → ((A → (B → F )) →
(A → F )) (ρ) only when A = 2, B = 1, and (A → (B → F )) → ((A →
B)→ (A→ F )) (ρ′) only when A = B = 2.
Now, our question is: could ρ and/or ρ′ be introduced in Bmr as, e.g.,
A10 has been introduced or, for example, T16 can be? Our conjecture is
that they can’t: A11 below (or some instance of it – cf. some lines below-)
seems necessary in the proof of the canonical adequacy of the semantical
postulates for ρ and ρ′. We establish in what follows a setting for discussing
the point.
8. The positive logic Bp+ and its minimal negation.
In order to define the logic Bp+ [B+ with prefixing as a theorem] we
add to B+ the axiom
A11. (B → C)→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
Models are defined similarly to B+ models but with the addition of the
postulate
P7. R2abcd⇒ ∃x(Rbcx and Raxd)
Theorem 8.1. ⊢Bp+ A iff |=Bp+ A
Proof. For the semantic consistency of Bp+, we have to prove that
A11 is valid. Use P7. For its completeness, given Theorem 2.2, clearly we
just need to verify that P7 holds in the canonical model. !
Bpm is defined from Bp+ as Bm was defined from B+. Models for
Bpm are exactly as those for Bm, but with the addition of P7.
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Theorem 8.2. ⊢Bpm A iff |=Bpm A
Proof. (a) Semantic consistency. As the proof of Bm: A11 is valid
(cf. Theorem 4.1). (b) Completeness. Given Theorem 4.2, we just have to
prove the fact that P6 holds in the canonical model. !
9. Bpm with ρ and ρ′: the logic Bpmr.
We add to Bpm the axiom
A12. (A→ B)→ ((A→ (B → F ))→ (A→ F ))
noting that
T22. (A→ (B → F ))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ F ))
becomes a theorem. Moreover, we note that (in addition to T22) T15, T16,
T17, T18 or T19 can now be used , among other possibilities, to axiomatize
Bpmr instead of A12.
Models for Bpmr are defined as those for Bmr but with the addition
of the postulate
P8. R2abcd⇒ ∃x∃y∃z(Racy and Rbcx and Rxyz and z ∈ S)
Theorem 9.1. (Semantic consistency of Bpmr) If ⊢Bpmr A, then
|=Bpmr A
Proof. Use Theorem 8.2 and P8 to prove the validity of A12. !
Note. For T22 we use the postulate
P8’. R2abcd⇒ ∃x∃y∃z(Racy and Rbcx and Ryxz and z ∈ S)
P8 and P8’ are provably equivalent with P4 [see §5]. For T15, T16, T17,
T18 and T19 use P6.
Canonical models for Bpmr are defined as the corresponding ones for
Bmr. Again, an analogue of Lemma 2.4 is immediate for Bpmr.
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Lemma 9.1. Let a, b, c, d ∈ KT and let d be a consistent theory. If
RT2abcd, then there are x, y, z ∈ KC such that RTacy, RT bcx, RTxyz and
z ∈ SC .
Proof. Suppose RT2abcd, i.e., RTabx and RTxcd with a, b, c, d ∈ KT
and d consistent.
Define as in Lemma 2.5 the theories u = {B : ∃A(A → B ∈ a and
A ∈ c)}, w = {B : ∃A(A→ B) ∈ b and A ∈ c)}, v = {B : ∃A(A → B ∈ w
and A ∈ u)} satisfying RTacu, RT bcw and RTwuv. We prove that v is
consistent. Otherwise, F ∈ v [Lemma 4.1.]. Definitions grant A → (B →
F ) ∈ b, C → B ∈ a, A,C ∈ c. By A9, (B → F ) → (C → F ) ∈ a.
Since ((B → F ) → (C → F )) → ((A → (B → F )) → (A → (C → F )))
is a theorem [A11], (A → (B → F )) → (A → (C → F )) ∈ a. Given
RTabx and A → (B → F ) ∈ b, necessarily A → (C → F ) ∈ x. But
(A→ (C → F ))→ ((A∧C)→ F ) is a theorem [T18]. So, (A∧C)→ F ∈ x.
As RTxcd and A∧C ∈ c, a fortiori F ∈ d, which contradicts the consistency
of d. We conclude that w is consistent. Now, Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 apply
and we can define x, y, z ∈ KC such that u ⊆ y, w ⊆ x, v ⊆ z and RTacy,
RT bcx, RTxyz and z ∈ SC , as required. !
From Lemma 9.1 we deduce:
Lemma 9.2. Canonical P8 holds in the Bpmr canonical model.
And from both Lemmas 9.1 and 9.2,
Lemma 9.3. Any Bpmr canonical model is a Bpmr model.
Theorem 9.2. (Completeness of Bpmr) If |=Bpmr A then ⊢Bpmr A.
Proof. Analogue of Lemma 4.3 for Bpmr and Lemma 9.3. !
Note. The proof that the canonical P8’ holds in the Bpmr canonical
model is similar to that for P8.
10. Four final remarks
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A. Bm, Bmr, Bpm and Bpmr can in principle be defined with a nega-
tion connective instead of the falsity constant F . See [10] for a general
strategy.
B. Given B+, weak double negation and contraposition are isolable.
Let Bc [B+ with weak contraposition] and Bdn [B+ with weak double
negation] be the result of adding
A9. (A→ B)→ ((B → F )→ (A→ F ))
and
A8. A→ ((A→ F )→ F )
to B+, respectively.
C. The relations the logics treated in this paper maintain to each other
can be summarized in the following diagram:
D. We have shown how to introduce minimal negation (in the sense of
(b) in the introduction) in any logic containing the logic B+ (reductio
as a rule) and Bp+ (reductio as a theorem).
64 GEMMA ROBLES, JOSE´ M. MENDEZ and FRANCISCO SALTO
Notes
1. Work partially supported by grant BFF-2001-2066, Ministerio de
Ciencia y Tecnolog´ıa, Espan˜a. (Ministry of Science and Technology,
Spain)
2. Acknowledgement. Our gratitude to Prof. John Slaney, for his MAG-
ICal support.
3. We thank a referee of RML for his/her comments on a previous ver-
sion of this paper.
.References
[1] A.R. Anderson, N.D. Belnap et al, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neces-
sity, vol. I, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1975.
[2] A.R. Anderson, N.D. Belnap, J.M. Dunn et al, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance
and Necessity, vol. II, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1992.
[3] J.M. Dunn, Generalized ortho-Negation in: Negation: a Notion in Focus, edited by
H. Wansing, De Gruyter, Berlin 1996.
[4] J.M. Dunn and R.K. Meyer, Combinators and Structurally Free Logic, Logic Journal
of the IGPL 5 (1997), pp. 505–537.
[5] J.M. Dunn, A Comparative Study of various Model-theoretic Treatments of Negation:
A history of Formal Negation, pp. 23-51 in: What is negation?, edited by D. Gabbay
and H. Wansing, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1999.
[6] I. Johansson, Der Minimalkalku¨ll, ein reduzierter intuitionistischer Formalismus
Compositio Mathematica 4 (1936), pp. 119–36.
[7] A. N. Kolmogorov, On the principle of tertium non datur, in” van Heijenoort, From
Frege to Go¨del, C.U.P., 1967, pp. 414–437.
[8] E. Mares, A star-free semantics for R, Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (1995), pp.
579–590.
[9] J.M. Me´ndez, Constructive R, Bulletin of the Section of Logic 16 (1987), pp. 167–
175.
[10] J.M. Me´ndez and F. Salto, Intuitionistic Propositional Logic without‘contraction’ but
with ‘reductio’, Studia Logica 66 (2000), pp. 409–418.
[11] J.M. Me´ndez, Salto, F. and G. Robles, Anderson and Belnap’s minimal positive
logic with minimal negation, Reports on Mathematical Logic 36 (2002) pp. 117-130
[12] R.K. Meyer, Conserving Positive Logics, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14
(1973), pp. 224–236.
MINIMAL NEGATION IN THE TERNARY RELATIONAL SEMANTICS 65
[13] R.K Meyer and R. Routley, Algebraic Analysis of Entailment, Logique et Analyse
15 (1972), pp. 407–428.
[14] G. Priest and R. Sylvan Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics, Journal of
Philosophical Logic 21 (1992), pp. 217–232.
[15] G. Restall, Four Valued Semantics for Relevant Logics (and some of their rivals),
Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995), pp. 139–160.
[16] G. Restall, An Introduction to Substructural Logics, Routledge, London 1999.
Departamento de Filosof´ıa, Lo´gica y Filosof´ıa de la Ciencia
Campus Unamuno, Edifcio F.E.S.
Universidad de Salamanca
E-37007 Salamanca, Spain
sefus@usal.es
